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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
It is universally agreed that full faith and credit need not be accorded if
the judgment is penal3 ' or if the jurisdiction of the sister state is faulty.3 2 But
the jurisdictional issue cannot be raised if the defendant, as in the instant case,
participated in the original cause of action and there had full opportunity to con-
test the jurisdiction of the court.
33
If the Court's decision were otherwise it would encourage judgment defend-
ants to forum shop and take up residence in states where the cause of action which
their judgment is based upon has been abolished.'
EVIDENCE
Afforney-Client Privilege
The Court in Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations' held (4-3) that the defendant committee could not be re-
strained from making public a tape recording and transcript of a consultation
between the plaintiff and his attorney, even though it was procured by wiring a
room in the county jail where the plaintiff and his attorney believed they could
speak freely.
It is well settled that one accused of a crime has a right to counsel and a
right to consult privately with such counsel.2 Also, unless the client waives the
right, his attorney may not be forced to testify as to communications between
them. 3 If a communication between an attorney and his client is recorded, there
has been an unreasonable interference with the client's right to confer privately
with such counsel.4 And if such a recording was used against a person in a trial,
which resulted in his conviction, the conviction would be reversed due to the
lack of a fair trial.
5
Since the tape recording and transcript were not to be used in a prosecution
31. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892).
32. N.Y. ex rel Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Millikin v. Meyer,
311 U. S. 457 (1940).
33. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1947); State of Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265 (1888); Thomas v. Virdin, 160 Fed. 418 (2d Cir. 1908).
1. 3 N.Y.2d 92, 164 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1957).
2. People v. Cooper, 307 N.Y. 253, 120 N.E.2d 813 (1954).
3. N.Y. Civ. PpAc. ACT §§353, 354; See also New York City Council v. Gold-
water, 284 -. Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940).
4. United States ex. rel Cooper v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir. 1955), ccrI.
denied 349 U.S. 968 (1955); People v. Cooper, note 2 supra.
5. Fusco v. Moses, 304 N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952).
6. Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. dni ed 346
U.S. 827 (1953).
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of the plaintiff, the majority did not feel that there was an infringement on his
rights. Nor were the legislative hearings being held for the purpose of investi-
gating the plaintiff. Its purpose was to examine and to investigate state agencies
so as to recommend legislation to improve the effectiveness and the economy of
such agencies and when the legislature is fulfilling its constitutional function, the
judiciary should not interfere.6
The three dissenting judges wrote separate opinions. Judge Desmond did
not believe that any public official or body was free from the power of the court.
7
He also viewed this situation as a threatened violation of a fundamental constitu-
tional right and not merely an evidenciary question. It was pointed out that theie
are many instances where the accused can only consult with his attorney in the
jail8 and if the majority view prevailed, he would never have an opportunity for
private consultation.
Judge Dye and Judge Fuld concurred with Judge Desmond in finding that
the plaintiff was denied one of his very basic rights. However all three judges
spoke in terms of what great harm can result from the failure to restrain the use
of such evidence; but they did not specify any disastrous result. As the majority
pointed out, the plaintiff was not being prosecuted on the basis of this evidence
and they definitely stated that if such was the case, their decision ,would have
been contra.
Husband-Wife Privilege
At common law, as a general rule, a husband or wife were forbidden to be
witnesses for or against each other.9 Although exceptions gradually came to be
recognized at common law,'0 it remained for the legislatures of the various juris-
dictions to determine what inroads should be made upon the privilege to facilitate
the judicial quest for truth.
In Poppe v. Poppe,". the Court of Appeals was called on to interpret section
349 of the Civil Practice Act, which provides, in so fdr as is pertinent here, "... A
husband or wife shall not be compelled, or without the consent of the other if
living, allowed to disclose a confidential communication made by one to the other
during marriage." As can be seen, the sine qua non of the privilege is the existence
of a "confidential communication." It has been held that for a communication to
be "confidentiar' it must be one emanating by reason of the implicit relationship
7. Youngstown Sheets & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRAC. §552; N.Y. CORRECTION LAW §§216-218.
9. Davis v. Dinwoody, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241 (1792).
10. See e.g., 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2239 (3d ed. 1940).
11. 3 N.Y.2d 312, 165 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957).
